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The aim of this paper is to analyse the degree of optimality of the endowments of public capital in the 
Spanish regions. To this end, we will estimate a growth equation derived from a simple production function, 
where the coefficients on the rates of investment in private and government capital would be their respective 
marginal products. By comparing the estimates of the marginal products for both factors, we would be able to 
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 Following  Aschauer’s (1989) influential contribution, the role of public investment has been stressed as a 
crucial factor leading to higher private capital productivity, which would lead in turn to higher growth rates. 
According to this author, the decline in productivity growth experienced by the US economy during the seventies, 
would explained to a great extent by the decrease in the provision of public infrastructures during that period. In this 
way, the next years have witnessed the appearance of a great amount of empirical literature that analysed the impact 
of public investment on economic growth; a comprehensive survey of that literature can be found in Sturm, Kuper 
and de Haan (1998). 
 
  Although the first empirical studies made use of aggregate time series for countries, this approach has been 
also extended to a regional framework using panel data, obtaining results that were quantitatively lower than those 
found with aggregate data [see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin (1994)]. The reason would be the spillover effects related to the 
regional endowments of public capital, whose effect would extend not only the own region, but also to the 
neighbouring regions. In any case, public infrastructure seems to play an important role in the growth process of 
regions that should not be neglected  (Button, 1998). 
 
  On the other hand, the issue of the optimal endowments of public infrastructure has been hardly discussed. 
In an empirical analysis of the Swedish case, Berndt and Hansson (1992) pointed that, since, according to their 
estimates, public infrastructure capital would have been above its optimal level, this could help to explain the 
relatively weak effect found for the latter on productivity growth. More recently, Karras (1997) has developed a 
simple condition to assess whether public capital is optimally provided, namely, whether the marginal productivities 
of both private and public capital are equal or not. By estimating a simple growth equation for fifteen European 
countries during the period 1960-1992, he is unable to reject the null hypothesis that the marginal productivities of 
private and public capital are equal, so that government investment would be neither underprovided nor 
overprovided in the fifteen countries of his sample. 
 
In this paper we try to address this issue (i.e., whether the endowments of public investment are optimal 
or not) in a regional framework, using Spanish data for the period 1967-91. The Spanish economy can provide 
an interesting case of study, since it has experienced a sustained period of growth in the last forty years, which 
has been accompanied by a strong process of structural change. In particular, the establishment of new regional 
governments after the restoration of democracy in 1977, coupled with the strong increase experienced by public 
investment since them, are all of them elements that can justify the interest of the Spanish case for the objectives 
of this paper. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the theoretical condition under which public capital would 
be optimally provided is derived from an optimization growth model. In section 3, we provide an empirical 
application of the model, for the case of the Spanish regions during the period 1967-1991. Finally, the main 2 
 
  





2. Theoretical framework 
In this section we will derive the condition that will allow as to assess whether public capital is optimally 
provided or not, following the approach of Karras (1997). The theoretical framework is based on Ramsey’s 
optimization growth model [see Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for an overview], extended to incorporate the role of 
government capital into the production function. 
 
We begin by assuming an aggregate production function such as: 
  ) , , ( t t t t t L KG K F A Y =  (1) 
where Y denotes real output, which depends on the amounts utilized of private capital, K, government capital, KG, 
and labour, L; A is an index of the level of technology. The function F is assumed twice continuously differentiable, 
















F  (for X = K, KG, L), and homogeneous of degree one in all the 
productive factors. The last assumption allows us to write the production function in per capita terms: 
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f  (for x = k, kg). 
 
  The output is either consumed or invested, so that, in per capita terms: 





t =  , c is per capita consumption, δ  is the rate of depreciation of private capital, n is the rate of 
population growth. The last term in equation (3), τ , denotes taxes per capita, which are used to finance government 
capital’s accumulation following the government budget constraint, also in per capita terms: 





t =  , and government capital is assumed to depreciate at the same rate than private capital. 
 
  On the other hand, the representative individual is assumed to maximize utility, which depends on per 




∞ ρ − =
0 ) ( dt e c u U
t
t  (5) 




u , subject to (3), (4), and k0, kg0 > 0. This optimization 
problem is solved by setting the Hamiltonian: 
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from which the first-order conditions would be: 
















1 1 1 ) ( λ − = + δ λ − λ =
∂







2 2 1 ) ( λ − = + δ λ − λ =
∂








  In this way, from the first three conditions we get: 







and, for the last three: 
  kg t k t f A f A =  (7) 
where At  fk and At  fkg are the marginal products of private and government capital, respectively. Equation (6) is the 
Euler condition, which implies that, the higher the marginal product of private capital (net of depreciation and 
population growth) relative to the rate of time preference, the more it pays to depress the current level of 
consumption in order to enjoy higher consumption later. In turn, equation (7) states that optimal accumulation 
of private and government capital requires that their marginal products be equal. The latter condition would 
imply that, given the marginal product of private capital, if the marginal product of government capital would 
be higher than that of private capital, it would be profitable for the government to raise public investment; in 
other words, and assuming that private capital is optimally provided, a marginal product of government capital 
above (below) the marginal product of private capital would mean that government capital is underprovided 
(overprovided), relative to private capital. In the next section we will provide an empirical test of equation (7), 
using Spanish regional data. 5 
 
  
3. Empirical model and results 
In order to test empirically equation (7), we start from the production function above, equation (1), with 
time subscripts omitted for simplicity: 
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=  denotes the 
elasticity of real output with respect to variable X (for X = K, KG, L). 
 
  On the other hand, the accumulation of private and government capital would be given by: 
  K Y s K K δ − =   (9) 
 
  KG Y s G K KG δ − =   (10) 
where sK and sKG are the output shares of gross investment in private and government capital, respectively; and δ  is 
the depreciation rate (assumed to be the same for both types of capital). 
 
  Replacing the accumulation equations (9) and (10) in (8) above, we get: 






=  denotes the rate of growth of variable X (for X = Y,  A,  L); and 
K
Y
e MPK K =  and 
KG
Y
e MPKG KG =  are the marginal products of private and government capital, respectively. Finally, writing 
(11) in per capita terms, assuming constant returns to scale (so that eK + eKG + eL = 1), we get: 
  ) )( ( L KG K KG K A y g e e s MPKG s MPK g g + + − + + = δ  (12) 
where gy denotes the rate of growth of per capita output. In the rest of this section we will provide econometric 
estimates of equation (12), and then a test on the estimated coefficients on sK and sKG being equal will be performed. 
 
  The data used in the empirical part of the paper come from an earlier paper by the authors (Bajo-Rubio, 
Díaz-Roldán and Montávez-Garcés, 1999), and cover the 17 regions (“comunidades autónomas”) established after 
the approval of the current Spanish Constitution in 1978, along the period 1967-1991. In particular, real GDP is 
taken from Doménech, Escribá and Murgui (1999), the data on physical capital investment (both private and public) 
have been taken from Mas, Pérez and Uriel (1995), and those on human capital and population (see below) come 6 
 
  
from Mas, Pérez, Uriel and Serrano (1995). The exact definition of the data can be found in the Appendix. 
 
  There is some available evidence on the favourable effect of the public capital stock on the 
productivity of private capital for the Spanish case, both with aggregate data (e.g., Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-
Rivero, 1993), and with regional data (e.g., Mas, Maudos, Pérez and Uriel, 1996). Regarding the evidence 
specifically addressed to the study of growth, Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1998) found a positive effect on 
growth for public investment as a percentage of GDP, with aggregate data for the whole Spanish economy, for 
the period 1964-93. Finally, in Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán and Montávez-Garcés (1999) the same result was 
obtained when estimating a convergence regression with regional data over the period 1967-91. 
 
  Some descriptive evidence is provided in Figures 1 and 2, which show the levels of per capita GDP (in real 
terms) and the GDP share of government investment, for the 17 Spanish regions in the first and last year of our 
sample period, respectively. As can be seen in Figure 1, per capita GDP would have experienced a significant 
increase between both dates, reaching twice its initial level in most regions. The growth in per capita GDP would 
have been somewhat stronger in the case of poorer regions, supporting previous findings on convergence [see, e.g., 
Raymond and García (1994)]. In turn, the evolution of the GDP share of government investment would have been 
also impressive, being this increase especially remarkable after the first eighties, when the first Socialist government 
took office. 
 
  Some econometric estimates of equation (12) are provided in Table 1, where the whole period of analysis 
has been divided into five-year spans in order to avoid the effect of cyclical fluctuations. The method of estimation 
is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) including individual effects for each region, which would proxy the differential 
effect of technical progress among regions.  
 
  The results of the estimation for the whole set of regions are shown in column (1). We obtain the expected 
signs, together with significant coefficients for every variable. In particular, the output shares of gross investment in 
both private and government capital would affect positively per capita output growth; these results are not 
substantially modified when human capital (measured by the initial value of the share of working-age population 
with undergraduate studies) is introduced in column (2). In addition, according to the reported values of the F-
statistic, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on sK and sKG are equal can be rejected at the 5% level. Therefore, 
government capital would have been productive (that is, it would have contributed to the growth of per capita GDP) 
in the Spanish regions during our period of analysis; and, since its estimated marginal product would be higher than 
that for private capital, it would have been still underprovided along the whole period.  
 
  Next, as in our previous paper, we have divided regions into two groups, i.e., those with per capita GDP 
above and below the Spanish average in 1967 (the first year of our sample). The results from estimating equation 
(12) for both groups of regions (defined in the Appendix) appear in columns (3) to (6). As can be seen, the basic 7 
 
  
results still hold, even though stronger for “poor” regions. On the contrary, in the case of “rich” regions the 
coefficient on government capital is significant just at the 20% significance level, and the null hypothesis of the 






  In this paper we have tried to find some evidence on the optimality of the provision of government capital 
in the Spanish regions. To this end, we have derived from an optimization growth model a condition allowing us to 
assess whether public capital would be under or overprovided. This theoretical condition consists in testing whether 
the marginal products of private and government capital are equal or not.  
 
  This condition has been tested empirically using regional Spanish data during the period 1967-1991, by 
estimating a growth equation derived from a simple production function. When the model was estimated for the 
whole set of regions, favourable results were obtained regarding the effect of both private and public capital on 
growth. In addition, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on both types of capital are equal could be rejected, and 
the estimated coefficient on government investment proved to be higher than that on private investment. The basic 
results were not substantially modified when regions were separated according to their initial per capita GDP, 
although the coefficient on government capital showed a lower significance in the case of richer regions. Therefore, 
according with these results, government capital would be still underprovided in the Spanish regions, despite the 
high increase experienced in last years, in particular for the poorer regions. 
 
In spite of the caution with which our provisional results should be taken, the main conclusion leads to a 
clear policy implication. Government capital would have been a relevant factor behind the growth process 
experienced by Spanish regions in last years, but there is still room for higher levels of public investment, especially 
in poorer regions. 9 
 
  
Appendix: Definitions and data sources 
We have used annual data for the period 1967-1991. The variables included in the tables are defined as follows: 
  gy:   rate of growth of per working-age person GDP at factor cost, at 1980 prices, for each subperiod. 
Source: Doménech, Escribá and Murgui (1999). 
  δ :   rate of depreciation, equal to 8.28 per cent, the average of those used in Mas, Pérez and Uriel 
(1995). 
  gL:   annual average of the rate of growth of working-age population for each subperiod. Source: Mas, 
Pérez, Uriel and Serrano (1995). 
  sK:    annual average of the share of private physical capital investment in total GDP for each 
subperiod. Source: Mas, Pérez and Uriel (1995). 
  sKG:   annual average of the share of public physical capital investment in total GDP for each subperiod. 
Source: Mas, Pérez and Uriel (1995). 
  sH:   initial value of the share of working-age population with undergraduate studies, for the first year 
of every time span (1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987). Source: Mas, Pérez, Uriel and Serrano 
(1995). 
  
 The  “richer” regions appearing in Table 1 are: Madrid, País Vasco, Cataluña, Baleares, Cantabria, Navarra, 
and Asturias; and the “poorer” regions appearing in that table are: La Rioja, Comunidad Valenciana, Aragón, 
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Dependent variable: gy 
 
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)               (5)             (6)   
 
 
) g ( L + δ              -1.3103                  -1.2720                        -0.2641                     -0.1588                      -2.3484                  -2.4800    
            (-3.9270)                (-3.9185)                     (-0.4641)                  (-0.2790)                    (-5.9010)               (-6.7932) 
 
sK                   0.2607             0.2720              0.1802                      0.1925                       0.3042                    0.3156 
                                (6.7757)                 (7.2098)                      (2.7359)                    (2.9218)                     (7.2872)                 (8.2605) 
 
 
sKG                   0.6718             0.7538                         0.4884                      0.5236                        1.0623                   1.2525 
                                (3.2453)                (3.6860)                       (1.3763)                    (1.4872)                    (4.6277)                 (5.7251) 
 
                            
sH                                _                        0.1707                            _                             0.1849                           _                         0.2179 
                                                              (2.2075)                                                        (1.2499)                                                    (2.9396) 
 
  F                    4.9188               6.9388                        0.9145                       5.6391                       13.2107                   4.2513  
               [0.0293]                    [0.0101]                     [0.3460]                    [0.0239]                      [0.0006]                 [0.0449] 
 
  R
2                 0.4979                       0.5334                       0.3487                      0.3885                        0.6738                    0.7369 
 


























 FIGURE 2: PUBLIC INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF 




































































































































































FIGURE 1:  PER CAPITA GDP,  SPANISH REGIONS,
1967 AND 1991
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